Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management Studies

Abstract Recently, there has been a notable increase in research efforts focused on achieving supply chain (SC) coordination by considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a crucial factor in decision-making. This study explores the coordination of a two-stage SC, including a manufacturer with CSR investment and a retailer with marketing efforts, under deterministic and stochastic with partial information demand scenarios. Furthermore, it analyzes decisions related to pricing, order quantity, CSR investment, and marketing efforts by presenting decentralized, centralized, and coordinated strategies. A comprehensive numerical analysis, involving a numerical example and a set of sensitivity analyses, is conducted to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed models. Results indicate that a two-part tariff (TPT) contract can effectively coordinate the SC and motivate the manufacturer to enhance its CSR investment, ultimately resulting in profitability equivalent to that of the centralized strategy. Moreover, the manufacturer's CSR investment and the retailer's marketing efforts contribute to increased market demand and profitability.

Abstract In this paper, the coordination of pricing and periodic review inventory decisions in a supplier-retailer supply chain (SC) is proposed. In the investigated SC, the retailer faces a stochastic price dependent demand and determines the review period, order-up-to-level, and retail price. On the other hand, the supplier decides on the replenishment multiplier. Firstly, the decentralized and centralized decision making models are established. Afterwards, a quantity discount contract as an incentive scheme is developed to coordinate the pricing and periodic review replenishment decisions simultaneously. The minimum and maximum discount factors, which are acceptable to both SC members, are determined. In addition, a set of numerical examples is conducted to demonstrate the performance of the proposed coordination model. The results demonstrate that the proposed coordination mechanism can improve the profitability of SC along with both the SC members in comparison with the decentralized model. In addition, the results revealed that the proposed incentive scheme is able to achieve channel coordination. Moreover, the coordination model can fairly share the surplus profits between SC members based on their bargaining power.