Maryam Noroozi; Mohammad Reza Gholamian
Abstract
In the proposed study, an inventory model of a two-echelon green perishable supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer is investigated. The produced items have a deterministic shelf life and will be removed from the shelves when they reach to their expiration date. A novel formulation ...
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In the proposed study, an inventory model of a two-echelon green perishable supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer is investigated. The produced items have a deterministic shelf life and will be removed from the shelves when they reach to their expiration date. A novel formulation of the demand function is also presented, which is a multiplicative function of time after replenishment, retail price, and green improvement level. The formulated demand function increases with the time to expiration and the green improvement degree; it also decreases with the retail price. The mentioned characteristics in this supply chain are derived from the industries of selling fruits, vegetables, meat and poultry, as well as dairy products. The manufacturer is considered the leader of the Stackelberg game, and three approaches are proposed to solve the inventory model: Decentralized, Centralized, and Coordinated by the revenue and green technology investment cost sharing contract, which guarantees more profit for each member than the decentralized decision-making approach. The numerical results demonstrate that the proposed revenue-sharing contract could successfully help the supply chain members to achieve the potential supply chain profit in the centralized approach. A comparative study is also conducted to show the differences between implementing and not implementing green technology investments, which shows the profitability of making green technology investments when consumers have green preferences. It was observed that as the reservation cost increases, the importance of investments in green technology will increase for both parties. Also, with high potential market demand, it is more beneficial to invest in green technology. This study deals with a contribution to the formulation of the demand function, as a novel multiplicative function of time after replenishment in the form of power function, and retail price and green improvement level in the form of complementary linear function.
Mojtaba Arab Momeni; Saeed Yaghoubi; Mohammad Reza Mohammad Aliha
Abstract
In this paper, an inventory model for deterioration items in a two-echelon supply chain including one retailer and one manufacturer is proposed by considering the stock and price dependent demand and capacity constraint for holding inventories. First, the model is presented as a leader-follower game ...
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In this paper, an inventory model for deterioration items in a two-echelon supply chain including one retailer and one manufacturer is proposed by considering the stock and price dependent demand and capacity constraint for holding inventories. First, the model is presented as a leader-follower game in which the manufacturer announces wholesale prices. Second, the retailer decides for the order quantity and price of the items based on the wholesale prices. Then, by introducing the integrated model of the supply chain, a cost-sharing contract is applied to coordinate the manufacturer and the retailer. On the other hand, by using the convergence properties of the model and proving non-concavity of the problem, a meta-heuristic algorithm, namely iterative local search (ILS) is proposed to solve the models. The results show the determinant role of the capacity constraint on the optimal decisions and the ability of the proposed contract to coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, it is shown that the proposed algorithm outperforms the well-known interior point algorithm as the results of the initiations embedded in it for the special problem.
Reza Pakdel Mehrabani; Abbas Seifi
Abstract
This paper investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for pricing and ordering decisions in a multi-channel supply chain. We study a situation where a manufacturer is going to open a direct online channel in addition to n existing traditional retail channels. It is assumed that the manufacturer is the ...
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This paper investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for pricing and ordering decisions in a multi-channel supply chain. We study a situation where a manufacturer is going to open a direct online channel in addition to n existing traditional retail channels. It is assumed that the manufacturer is the leader and the retailers are the followers. The situation has a hierarchical nature and is formulated as a bi-level programming problem. The upper level problem is a mathematical model dealing with decisions of the manufacturer, while the lower level is a Nash equilibrium model determining the retail prices and order quantities by formulating the competition between the physical retailers. We consider a price-sensitive linear demand model with an additive uncertain part and analyze the optimal decisions for each sales channel. To enable supply chain coordination, we propose a particular revenue-sharing contract. This contract enables the retailers to set pricing and ordering policies that are equivalent to those in an integrated supply chain. Finally, we examine the impact of the model parameters on the equilibrium with a comprehensive numerical study.
M. Johari; S.M. Hosseini Motlagh; M.R. Nematollahi
Volume 3, Issue 2 , December 2016, , Pages 58-87
Abstract
In this paper, the coordination of pricing and periodic review inventory decisions in a supplier-retailer supply chain (SC) is proposed. In the investigated SC, the retailer faces a stochastic price dependent demand and determines the review period, order-up-to-level, and retail price. On the other hand, ...
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In this paper, the coordination of pricing and periodic review inventory decisions in a supplier-retailer supply chain (SC) is proposed. In the investigated SC, the retailer faces a stochastic price dependent demand and determines the review period, order-up-to-level, and retail price. On the other hand, the supplier decides on the replenishment multiplier. Firstly, the decentralized and centralized decision making models are established. Afterwards, a quantity discount contract as an incentive scheme is developed to coordinate the pricing and periodic review replenishment decisions simultaneously. The minimum and maximum discount factors, which are acceptable to both SC members, are determined. In addition, a set of numerical examples is conducted to demonstrate the performance of the proposed coordination model. The results demonstrate that the proposed coordination mechanism can improve the profitability of SC along with both the SC members in comparison with the decentralized model. In addition, the results revealed that the proposed incentive scheme is able to achieve channel coordination. Moreover, the coordination model can fairly share the surplus profits between SC members based on their bargaining power.